For those not spending the last few days following the various news and twitter feeds, here's a quick recap of what is going on with the recent unrest in Kyrgyzstan and what it might actually mean.
(photo at left from my trip to Bishkek in June, 2009)
First, let me say that there are a suprisingly large number of news organizations, professional freelance journalists, and amateur reporters covering this directly from Bishkek. I have listed some of the most thorough and reliable sources at the bottom, and if you really want the best view of what's going on, I would encourage you to consult these often for updates. Many of them are in Russian, but if you are using the Google Chrome browser, it can automatically translate to English with decent enough reliability to be informative.
Let me also add that my personal connection with Kyrgyzstan is based on a 2-month internship I had with the local Radio Free Europe branch, Radio Azattyk, in summer 2009. While I was there, I covered issues of international relations (esp. with US) and the rigged Presidential Elections. I certainly have my biases and particular perspectives, all of which are now some 8 months out of date, but hopefully I'm still informed enough to be useful.
In July 2009, Incumbent President Kurmanbek Bakiev was re-elected to a second term in a national election that was widely regarded by international observers as highly fraudulent. It was a rigged election that was carried out at such a high administrative level, that there was no need for (much) blatant fraud like ballot stuffing or police intimidation on the day of the election. Opposition party leaders and candidates, especially Almazbek Atambayev, called for public protests, but very little actually happened. In the official tally, Bakiev won an overwhelming majority, the opposition lodged formal protests, and then nothing happened.
Four years earlier, in 2005, a similar rigged election was followed by intense public outcry for both the lack of transparency and the intense corruption and nepotism of then-president Aksar Akayev. Beginning in the regions of Osh, Talas and Naryn, and which ultimately resulted in mass public protests. Facing such hostility, the president resigned and fled to Moscow, where he still lives.
From 2005-2007, hopes were high in Kyrgyzstan. The new government represented politicians from both the North and South regions, made promises about democratic and economic reform, and actually moved to strengthen the parliament over the presidency. This all changed in 2007, when a leader of the 2005 "Tulip Revolution" Kurmanbek Bakiev, elected president in a generally well-run election, pushed through constitutional reforms through a national referendum vote. The reforms restructured the legislature, changed election laws, and gave the president more power; the vote was considered rigged. Once the referendum passed, Bakiev dissolved parliament, created his own political party, and called for new elections. The resulting 2007 parliamentary elections were also highly fraudulent, and Bakiev's Ak Jol party took an overwhelming majority. The main opposition party, Ata-Meken (Fatherland) was completely shut out of government on a technicality of the new elections laws, despite accruing the second most votes. The Social Democrats and Communist party each received a handful of seats, but no real power.
From 2007 to 2009, Bakiev consolidated further economic interests and political appointments for his family, especially his brother, now the head of the state security forces. In the lead up to the 2009 presidential election, Bakiev amended the constitution again to extend the president's term from 4 to 5 years, and began imposing restrictions on freedoms of speech and assembly. While Kyrgyzstan from 2005-2009 had below-par political rights as rated by Freedom House, for much of this period it remained the best-scoring country in Central Asia in the areas of Civic freedoms, such as independent media, free assembly, etc. This all began to change in March 2009.
Following the 2009 election, with Bakiev's power formally consolidated through 2014, he made another restructuring of the government, replacing the Prime Minister and other Cabinet officers, and placing his son, Maksim, as the head of a newly created bureau to oversee Economic Development in Kyrgyzstan. This organization was entrusted with implementing infrastructure projects like the Kumbarata-1 and 2 hydroelectric power plants, for which Russia supplied $2 billion in loans, which many observers see as a bribe to convince Bakiev to oust the US military "Manas" airbase near Bishkek, which is providing logistical support for operations in Afghanistan. Bakiev did order the base closed, but after significant negotiations, remitted the order, and instead accepted a new 1-year contract for $15 million, a three-fold increase over the previous rent agreement.
Russia was not happy, but things got much worse when it was revealed that the organization Maksim ran had not been investing the first part of the Russian loan into the power plants, but was instead re-loaning the money to other organizations in order to make profit on its interest. When an associate of Maksim's was then charged by Italy with several billion dollars worth of fraud, the Bakiev family took another hit. Attempting to prevent public unrest, president Bakiev began closing independent media outlets, and further restricting public assemblies.
In March 2010, Bakiev called a "Kuraltai," or traditional meeting of elders, hoping to demonstrate the support he still enjoyed from "the people," a clear expression of just how bankrupt the formal election and parliamentary systems are. Participants were carefully chosen from supposed Bakiev supporters, with no opposition members present, but things still didn't go as Bakiev hoped. News of Maksim's ineptitude and corruption were still paramount in Kyrgyz opinion, and many of these moderates spoke viciously of Bakiev's failure as president.
Under seige from the usually-weak opposition, and now from former supporters, Bakiev was in a precarious situation, but his large and loyal police force, and the general difficulty of motivating public protest didn't suggest any major problems in the near future. Then Russia, in an apparent quid pro quo for Bakiev's betrayal on the Manas issue, lifted its subsidies on energy exports to Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz utilities, privatized and controlled by the Bakiev family, passed the added cost directly to the consumers, and suddenly the largely poor Kyrgyz had cost increases of 200%.
This got people very, very upset.
Opposition politicians seized on the opportunity, combined with the recent visit of UN secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon - to call for a national day of protest on April 7. Bakiev moved to subvert this by arresting or attacking several opposition figures on April 6, and there was an immediate response in the regional opposition strongholds of Talas and Naryn. The Bishkek public also protested, and began to demand prisoner release. The next morning, a large crowd gathered at the head quarters of the Social Democrats in Bishkek. Major international observers were present, especially from the German embassy, which has always taken a very strong position on the maintenance of human and political rights in Kyrgyzstan. However, after international observers left (it is unclear why they all departed at the same time), riot police moved in to beat and detail protestors on the basis that the assembly did not have government approval.
From here, things really went down hill.
The protest spread, and angry Kyrgyz began attacking police in the streets with stones, seizing weapons, and moving toward the main government building, the "White House" in central Bishkek, near the main Ala-Too square. Violence was sporadic, with tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition used by both sides. Citizens and police were documented isolating members of the opposite camp and beating them. Government snipers were seen shooting at citizens in Ala-Too square.
Bakiev declared a state of emergency, then quickly fled to the southern city of Osh, where he believed he would have more public support. Protestors eventually captured the main government building, and forced the Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov and his cabinet to resign. A new interim "government of public trust" dissolved parliament, and began assigning offices to the major opposition leaders. Rosa Otunbayeva, a major component of the 2005 Tulip Revolution and former Foreign Minister under Bakiev, was named interim Prime Minister, and other major figures included Atambaev (Social Democrat) as Minister of Economic Development, Temir Sariek (Ak Shumkar party) as Minister of Finance, and Omurbek Tekebayev (Ata-Meken) in charge of drafting a new constitution. Ismail Isakov, the former Minister of Defense recently removed by Bakiev and put in jail because he protested Bakiev's increasingly authoritarian tendencies, was returned to his former position. Notably, most of these figures are from the Northern provinces, though Otunbayeva is a major exception - she is from Osh.
In the regions, the governors of Osh and Batken have resigned, and Bakiev has fled to his hometown outside the capital of the Jalalabad region. There, the governor has called for the creation of a militia to protect Bakiev, and seek to end the coup in the north. While initial reports of pro-Bakiev sentiments in Osh opened the possibility of a serious long-term conflict, even a type of limited civil war, the capitulation of Osh makes this now seem highly unlikely. Jalalabad is a small and poor province, and the loyalty of the Kyrgyz army to Isakov suggests Bakiev's power will be very difficult to project outside Jalalabad.
Meanwhile, Bishkek remains in turmoil. Angry protestors have turned into opportunistic looters. All grocery stores and shopping centers have been raided, and many destroyed. The police, which were extremely closely associated with Bakiev, disappeared from the streets on April 7. The new "interim government" is calling on people to stop looting and return to their homes and implementing a curfew, but there is little evidence they can enforce this.
On April 8, some progress does appear to be underway to control the lack of law and order. Volunteer neighborhood watch patrols are being formed, identifiable by white cloth tied on their arms, and the Army and Police have apparently pledged their allegiance to the interim gov. The new Minister of Internal Affairs has just authorized security personnel to use deadly force to stop looters. Whether or not this impacts order is yet to be seen, but that such an order was necessary for the new government to issue cannot be seen as a good sign.
One opposition figure who is not a member of the new government, Toktaim Umetalieva, remains actively in protest. Setup in Ala-Too square, Umetalieva, who is a major NGO leader and former 2-time presidential candidate, is demanding that the new government restore order and address the economic and political hardships of Kyrgyz citizens, rather than just awarding offices to major opposition figures. Thus, while Otunbayeva has emerged as the primary "official" representative of the 'revolution,' Umetalieva seems to be the unofficial "voice of the people" at the moment.
Initial moves by the new government have been to nationalize many of the major institutions that Bakiev privatized as president, and largely rested in his family network. Banks and major utility and telecommunications firms have been nationalized. Manas airport, which hosts the US airbase and which is run largely by Bakiev affiliates, is now under opposition ownership and management. For the moment, Otunbayeva is promising the continuation of the US-Manas status quo.
Russian PM Vladimir Putin has already called Otunbayev to recognize her as the legitimate head of the Kyrgyz Republic. US response has been much slower, and more tepid. When protests began, the US embassy in Bishkek, located outside of town and immediately adjacent the the President's Palace, only issued a weak call for an end to violence. For the majority of the turmoil, US embassy personnel have remained behind their walls, and seem to waiting to see where to place their bets. US interests in Kyrgyzstan are almost exclusively tied to the continuation of Manas airbase, technically a "transit center" as per the new 2009 contract. Operations at Manas have not been directly affected, though the base voluntarily suspended operations until events in Bishkek calmed down.
Form Jalalabad, Bakiev has stated that he has not - and will not - resign. On radio station Ekho Moskvy he called on all Kyrgyz to rise against the coup, but also admitted that while he was still the head of state, he had not ability to influence events in the capital. Some reports suggest Bakiev would submit a resignation if the security of his entire family could be guaranteed, and they would be allowed to stay in Kyrgyzstan (presumably with much of his state-funneled wealth). These same unconfirmed reports say the interim gov would be willing to guarantee Bakiev's personal security, but not that of his family, and that he would be required to leave Kyrgyzstan permanently.
The interim government has repeatedly professed its dedication to political liberalization and the implementation of democracy in Kyrgyzstan. Otunbayeva has a strong record as a pro-democracy advocate, and especially for supporting parliamentary compromise over strong presidential powers. Her adoption of the title interim Prime Minister - the interim always being stressed - is promising. There is no interim president. The government has stated that it will re-write the constitution and plan for Presidential and Parliamentary elections within 6 months.
However, this is obviously NOT a democratic transfer of power, even in the mold of the so-called "colored revolutions" of 2003-2005. To some degree, the recent events in Kyrgyzstan can be painted as a reaction to the increasing authoritarianism of president Bakiev, as embodied in the 2009 election fraud; but every indication is that this was more of a visceral reaction to the poor state of the economy, the impoverishment of the Kyrgyz citizen, the the increasing gap between the extreme (relative) wealth of the Bakiev clan and the average person. As with the 2005 "revolution," corruption and economics seem more at issue than political issues like democracy. It cannot be denied, though, that recent crack downs on civil rights and media freedoms have been a major driver of public discontent.
Looking beyond, it is hard to say what the next few days, weeks or months will present. Even hard to analyze what this transition "means" for Kyrgyzstan. In the best-case scenario, Bakiev is done forever as a force in Kyrgyz politics, the new government follows through with its promises of democratic reforms, and in 6 months open elections create a more representative government that is less subjective to elite manipulations, something like what happened in 2005. However, as that earlier example demonstrates, such "electoral opportunities" do not necessarily lead to consolidated democracy, improved economies, or increased citizen welfare. Kyrgyzstan has a Lot of difficult problems, and certainly if/when the dust settles, people will expect tangible results from the new government, whatever its composition. It is hard to imagine a government of conscience doing a worse job than Bakiev with the limited resources of Kyrgyzstan (it cannot, for example, support the kind of total military control possible in Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan), but the odds of an economically prosperous Kyrgyzstan coming about under and circumstances seem low.
And the conditions of the change of regime - whether we call it a coup or a revolution - have been far too violent to paint an exclusively rosy picture. Blood shed and excesses were committed by all sides, and its important to remember that there are more than 2 at play. Bakiev's regime (and the police who supported it) faced off against elite opposition politicians as well as the less homogenous and totally unorganized "people." Now, young kyrgyz continue to loot even while opposition elites call for an end to violence. Mob rule dominated Bishkek on April 7, and was only beginning to ebb on April 8.
The potential for further violence is still very high, and the threat to stability from both Bakiev and the interim government is not negligible.
I'm keeping my eyes on Bishkek, hoping for the most peaceful and beneficial long-term solution possible. I have a few friends there among the journalist community, and I have an incredible degree of respect for what they're doing, but am also worried about their safety.
Notably, I spoke with one associate who was an ardent opponent of Bakiev during the 2009 presidential election. At the time, she was not very impressed by the other candidates (including Sariev and Atambayev), but believed anything was better than more Bakiev. When I asked how people in Bishkek were responding on April 7, if they were celebrating or afraid, she emphatically said no one was celebrating.
If Bakiev is truly gone, I cannot believe this is a bad thing for the future of the Kyrgyz people, but certainly the method of his removal has been far from laudable. Still, I do believe the Kyrgyz people were being oppressed, and I know that the US was willing to ignore this fact so long as Bakiev remained committed to the Manas airbase.
For now, I believe all we can do is hope that something good will come out of the tragic and tumultuous events that have unfolded in the last few days.
Whether this represents a watershed moment in the history of Kyrgyzstan, or just another informal transfer of power to a new group of elite interests, is yet to be seen. I'm pulling for the former, though the lesson of recent history is that conditions in Central Asia lean toward the latter in the long run.
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